

What Drives the Youth Vote?: Evidences from Three Regional Election in Spain, 2012¹

Rosa M. Navarrete

Universität Mannheim

Javier Ramos Díaz

University of Zurich

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Work in progress. Comments are most welcome. Rosa M. Navarrete (rnavarre@students.uni-mannheim.de).

The relevance of youth vote and its problems to be studied.

Young voters can make the difference in some elections and political actors are well aware of that. While the act of voting tends to strengthen partisanship, those who are not tied by the habit of voting, who are not yet anchored by their past choices, represent a group interestingly enough for political parties. Political attitudes tend to be more stable in people aged over their thirties onwards and as time goes by citizens tend to be less volatile in their vote (Maccoby, Mathew and Morton. 1954, Alwin, 1994; Jennings et al., 2009). Once an individual votes for a party, there is a link that does not easily disappear, it is the beginning of party identification (Campbell et al., 1964:86).

Also, younger cohorts tend to vote much less than those more aged. There is an important number of young individuals with a high interest in politics who prefer other options of political participation rather than vote. In his doctoral thesis, Dinas (2010) highlights how young adults were decisive for Obama's election or how their mobilization after the terrorists attacks in Madrid turned the expected results in Spain 2008. *The impressionable years* play a key role in present and future politics. Adults under 30 are important targets of electoral campaigns that seek to gain new voters but also secure party's basis.

Therefore, it is not surprising why almost every party has groups of young supporters that, in some cases, are an important source for party's future but also an instrument to mobilize and attract others that could be less politicized.

Contrarily to what could be expected, literature about young voting is scarce. The main reason behind this is not a lack of interest, but the difficulty to obtain representative data. General surveys do not focus its attention in younger individuals. Moreover the not too many studies that focus on this group pay more attention to the background rather to short terms factors and issues determining vote choice. Most of the works put the scope on socialization and the formation of political attitudes, but we still know very little about what do the youth vote and why lead young individuals to decide for one party or another.

The very few panel studies about young adults preferences have analysed the role of the family in the transmission of political preference, treating partisanship as a kind of legacy inherited from parents to children (Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1981, Jennings and Markus, 1984). These studies took place in United States where the postulates of the Michigan School pushed this approach (Campbell et al., 1969). Nevertheless, this kind of surveys focusing on young voters are not common and even questions related to the impact of socialization and family dropped from questionnaires (Dinas, 2010: 274).

Recently, the effect of family in the formation of partisanship has been nuanced. The link between parents' party preferences and their children's is stronger when young individuals are less politicized. The impact of family is not homogeneous (Dinas, 2010:274) and even the relation between individual and party would be affected differently, being more or less emotional depending on family ties (Kroh and Selb, 2009). Therefore, it is needed to revisit some of the assumptions about what affects youth vote and how decision made in early adulthood can determine the future of politics. Once again, the problem lies on data availability.

Another striking question related to youth is why this young people tend to have a remarkable percentage of vote abstention, while they are, in many cases, politically active. Young abstentionists can be relevant members of social movements and political activists. Movements such as the 15M in Spain have young adults as main protagonists. They claim for a change in policy making and protested against social cuts. Nevertheless, one of the most repeated slogans by this movement was that of "No les votes"², together with some calls for abstention in the elections as a way to make visible their discontent. As the electoral participation of young citizens can be determinant, it is urgent to understand what leads them to decide to vote for a party.

² "No les votes" means "Do not vote for them". This slogan was a claim against major parties.

The case of Spain can be considered even more complex than those of other European countries as there are different levels of decisions and diverse social divisions may take part in vote choice. Regionalism is still vivid in some parts of Spain and has a key role in the historic communities (Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia). In these regions there is also an important gap between different cohorts, as the contexts of socialization of parents and their children is completely different. Oldest cohorts socialized in a society ruled by a dictator with little chance to debate and no opportunities to discuss regional identity. Thus, Spanish youth attitudes towards decentralization are different to those of their predecessors, at least in the way they were formed, and the link between ideology and positions towards regional devolution is stronger in younger adults (Dinas, 2012: 473). However, there very little information about youth vote in regional elections and how different cohorts vote in a multilevel system such as the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas*. Regional elections held in Spain in 2012 responded to early calls. Their peculiarities and why they were so different other moments are described in the next lines.

The context of regional elections in Galicia, Basque Country and Catalonia in 2012

37 years after the death of the dictator Franco, Spain is a consolidated democracy. Its political system balances regional autonomy and central government conforming and asymmetric federal state called *Estado de las Autonomías* (Linz and Montero, 1999; Perez-Nieva and Fraile, 2000; Fernandez-Albertos, 2002). In this complex state, Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia are distinguished by the Spanish Constitution as *Comunidades Históricas* (historical communities) because these three had a statute and regional institutions recognized before Franco's coup d'état. These also share the early formation of a strong regional identity.

Regional and state-wide parties interact at the national and regional level in a complex system in which alliances made at one level can determine the future of the other. The two big Spanish state-wide parties, PSOE (Socialist party) and PP (Conservative party) have been supported in central government by regional parties even when there was no ideological proximity. At the same time, results of regional elections can alter relations at the national level. State-wide parties can negotiate supports in national parliament with non-state wide parties, while the regional branches of the firsts have to compete at the regional level with the others. This way, regional parties from the Basque Country and Catalonia have played a key role holding minority governments at the State level. This is not the case of Galician parties that are much less relevant in national politics.

The context of the regional elections that took place in 2012 is different to others because regional tensions and debates about decentralization were rougher due to the effects of the economic crisis. These three regions have each a language different from the Spanish Castilian and a strong regional culture, but party systems and the circumstances that lead to regional elections are different and need to be separately commented.

The Galician government in 2012 was formed by the PP with Alberto Nuñez Feijoo as regional president. The Spanish conservatives had in Galicia one of their strongholds. The Galician identity did not suffer the same prosecution as Basques' and Catalan's and one of the founder members of the PP, Manuel Fraga, was a defender of Galician singularity and ruled this region for fifteen years as regional president. In August 2012 Feijoo called early elections to be held six months before the end of the legislature. The unpopular measures taken by the conservatives at the national level would be harsher in the next months and Feijoo tried to avoid punishment by calling early elections. As expected, the PP revalidated its majority with the socialists as second most voted party. The emergence of Alternativa Galega de Esquerda (Galician Leftist Party), a coalition of left-wing and regionalist groups that participated in the elections for the first time, seem to be the result of the mobilization

of young voters. Alternativa was the third force with more votes than the traditional regional party BNG (Bloque Nacionalista Galego).

The context of the Basque Country is even more singular as the elections of October 2012 were the firsts without terrorist menace of ETA. The socialist Patxi López, elected regional president in 2009, was the first president of the Basque region who does not belong to the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party). Lopez's government was supported by the conservatives in what was a pact of state-wide parties that clashed in economic ideology. This *anti natura* pact create institutional instability and Lopez had to call early elections to be held in October. The results were the sinking of the regional branches of PSOE and PP, with PNV and Bildu, a leftist secessionist party, being supported by 60 per cent of the voters.

Finally, elections in Catalonia were call in September to be held in November 2012. The apparent reason behind the call was a demonstration in which thousands of people claimed for a referendum about Catalan self-determination. The Catalan minoritarian government of the regional party CIU (Convergencia i Unió) was managing a difficult economic situation and took some very unpopular measures supported by the Catalan PP. The regional president, Artur Mas, understood that the demonstration was an opportunity to take advantage and try to get a majority of seats in Catalan parliament. With the promise of a referendum over self-determination, Mas focused its campaign in his nationalistic discourse, appealing to the emotional sentiment of Catalonia as a different nation. This move was very unfortunate because this debate about an hypothetical independence of Catalonia from Spain only reinforced ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), a party who always defended the referendum. CIU lost 8 points of vote share, showing that voters preferred the original defenders of the independence over the new ones.

As said, it is difficult to find data that could help us to clarify what leads young voters to vote for a particular party, it is even more complicated to obtain information about how a regional cleavage impact on the less aged. In next section we will highlight the usefulness of voting advice applications (VAAs) to obtain this data.

Voting advice applications: a useful tool for data gathering

The widespread use of internet and the advance of new technologies have made possible the development of cheaper ways to collect data. At the same time, individuals have better access to information about party's position and can make decisions over their vote choice investing less time than it was needed in the past. VAAs burst in different countries and their success, evidenced in the amount of users, has crossed the border of academics.

According to Cedroni and Garzía (2010:10) VAAs are “online database of parties' positions on a number of core policy issues”. Users fill an online questionnaire and their answers are compared to those of the different parties and a ranking of proximity towards parties' policy positions is shown. This ranking of parties is the “advice” that the voter received after answering the questionnaire. Therefore, Cedroni and Garzia (2010:10) stated that VAAs “are aimed primarily at increasing voters' understanding of what parties stand for at a very cheap cost (in terms of procurement, analysis, and evaluation) by means of an immediate and enjoyable approach. In turn, this can increase voters' interest in political matters, motivate them to discuss about politics, and hopefully gather further information”. Nevertheless, we consider VAAs are not only useful for voters who may want to know which party is closer to their positions on important issues, but also is a tool for researchers.

One of the problems with data from VAAs is that users are not previously selected, but they are open to anyone who may want to participate. This way, data samples obtained

from VAAs tend to be not representative of a society. As the questionnaire is filled on line and what the users get from their answer is information about parties, users have to be familiarized with internet and have some concerns about politics. This way, it has been highlighted the effect of generation in the usage of VAAs as most of the users are young male, highly educated and with political interest (Garzia, 2010:29). As we analyse youth vote, our target group was young voters. They are under-represented in general surveys but they are the most numerous group of users of VAAs.

At the same time, there were other considerations that lead us to decide for the use of data from VAAs as the most useful to our research. Young people are more vulnerable to social desirability (Mwamwenda 1995; Dinas, 2012: 479) and their answers in surveys can be influenced by the way they are done. Young respondents can have very few incentives to answer their true thoughts when they confront questions in which there is an “official” position of their most preferred party or even positions towards issues in which there is a clear correlation with ideology. To this point, Dinas (2012) has studied the effects of being interviewed with the presence of a third person on respondents’ placement on ideology and regional identity for the cases of Catalonia and Basque Country and has concluded that it affects pushing respondents towards pro-devolution opinions. In this sense, the use of VAAs let users to answer without confronting the idea of being judged by the interviewer or by a third person. VAAs favour the sincerity of respondents, letting them to be politically incorrect.

Data and methodology.

We used data collected from the VAAs that were launched on the occasion of the 21st October regional elections in Basque Country (www.horizonteuskadi.com) and Galicia (www.horizontegalicia.com), and for the 25th November in Catalonia (www.horizontecatalunya.com). The three teams working on the VAAs spread the

launching thru social networks, mostly Twitter and Facebook. This way, the VAAs caught the interest of press and regional and national newspapers paid attention to them, pushing up the number of visitors. Even more, in the case of *horizonteeuskadi* the regional TV from the Basque country made a short coverage about its functioning.

Users filled an online questionnaire with a total of 30 questions about issues concerning economy, society, politics and regional issues. There were also supplementary questions that gave information about respondents' positions on the left-right and centralization-decentralization scales, and other related to users' background such as level of studies, rent, age, etc. The questionnaire was the same for the three VAAs with the only distinction of the questions related to each region (see Appendix).

As respondents were self-selected into the sample, there were evident concerns about data quality that force us to "clean the data" before proceeding to analyse them. Entries were excluded when any of the following situations:

- 1) Time taken to complete the 30 issue statements were less than 120 seconds.
- 2) Time to respond any one issue statement was less than 2 seconds (or one second when the question was specially short).
- 3) Time taken to respond to three or more issues statements was less than 2 seconds.
- 4) Respondent answered 15 or more successive issue statements in the same way.
- 5) There was more than one entry from the same web browser and personal data do not demonstrated that he or she was a different user from the previous one.

After the cleaning process, the number of responses for the 3 VAA was over 50.000³ and approximately 50 per cent of respondents were adults under 30 years.⁴

³ Basque Country: N= 8776

Galicia: N= 12332

Catalonia: N= 30250

⁴ Percentages of users under 30 years were the following:

Basque Country: 45,8%

Galicia: 50,2%

With these data we proceeded to analyse what lead young voters to vote for a party in a regional election. To do so, we use multinomial regression with vote intention as our dependent variable and the party in government as reference category. Selected cases are those of individuals between 18 and 30 years who lived in the region under study. As we are trying to understand what leads youth to vote for a party, we tested two models: one in which different factors of voting are introduced to evaluate their impact on vote choice (ideology, a set of questions related to the region, moral values, education, gender, immigration and position towards austerity)⁵. The second model has the same variables but the reasons of voting are introduced as a way to evaluate whether voter decide according to her or his ideas, because she or he thinks it is the most honest party, the more efficient or because a political party is the less bad of those competing in this electoral process. Results are commented in the next section.

Results.

One phenomenon that is common in all three regions is that the effect of ideology is very intense. This has to be highlighted because literature stated that young cohorts are less affected by left-right ideology, due to the appearance of new issues and the fact that big parties tend to become more similar in terms of left-right ideology (Green and Hobolt, 2008; Van der Brug, 2010). In fact, attending to the results from the multinomial regression, young voters tend to vote with some ideological coherence. As an example, in Catalonia, voters of the PP do not differ ideologically from CIU and the austerity measures do not have effect on their preference of one party or other. What determines vote for PP over CIU are questions towards devolution. Nevertheless, in general, ideology has less impact than the index of question related to the region, while other factors such as moral and immigration seem to be far less determinant for vote. As we are analysing vote in

Catalonia56,4%

⁵ See Appendix to detailed information about variables.

three regions with strong regional identities and with open debates about the relationship of the rest of Spain with each of these regions, we expected that the index of questions concerning the region would have the bigger impact. It has to be said this index is built according to a scale running from positions in favour of a more centralized Spain to more autonomy and independence from the government in Madrid.

Models also show a good adjustment, being better when the reasons to vote are included in the regression.

<Tables 1 and 2 about here>

Taking a look to the tables of the Basque country we can realized that there is a clear division between parties concerning the debate about autonomy. It has been said before this is the more determinant factor of voting in all three regions. Nevertheless, results show some hints about the character of this nationalism. If we look at the results, we can see that nationalist/independentist parties differ ideologically from the party in government, the regional branch of the state-wide party PSOE. Voters of the PNV tend to be more to the right than socialists, while voters of EH-Bildu and EB-B locate themselves more to the left. The striking question is that, attending to what is shown in the results, those three parties agree in their positions against immigration, although they three are ideologically distant.

Looking to the reasons to vote for a party, we can see they are only significant for the three nationalistic parties. While voters of the PNV argue efficiency, those who vote for the party who better support her or his ideas are less likely to decide for PNV, Bildu and EB-B.

Concerning these last two parties, those who argue the less worse as a reason to vote tend to vote less to them.

<Tables 3 and 4 about here>

Ideology and devolution are important factors for vote choice for all parties, but there are some peculiarities in Galicia that need to be pointed out. Galicia is different to Catalonia and Basque Country because in Galicia is where gender has a more significant effect on vote. Also, it is striking how a conservative moral is a factor that has a positive effect on voting for Compromiso por Galicia over PP. For all the rest cases, there was some association between left-right ideology and morality, thus conservative ideology seems to be hand-in-hand with conservative morality. This is not the case here, because Compromiso is positioned more to the left compared to PP.

Concerning austerity, agreeing with it has a significant effect for voting PP versus any other party. The debate about the cuts on public sector affected also national government. As the PP was governing the region and the state, it is easy to understand why supporting austerity has a positive effect for vote for this party. The problem is to disentangle whether individuals support PP because they agree that cuts on public sector are a must, or they defend the discourse of austerity because they are decided to vote for the PP.

Other peculiarity of Galicia is that voting based on efficiency is always significant and is the main argument argued for voters for the PP as arguing this reason to vote has a negative effect in all the parties in respect of the PP. Only when we pay attention to vote on UpyD over PP, it is found that efficiency is not significant and individuals point to ideals as reason to prefer UpyD versus PP.

<Tables 5 and 6 about here>

Finally, Catalonia is the region in which the debate about its autonomy was tougher. The referendum about a possible secession was the central point of all electoral campaigns and those who maintained an ambiguous discourse without showing a clear position pro or anti-referendum were penalized in the polls (as was the case of the regional branch of the PSOE). Nevertheless, the analysis shows that young voters do not decide taking into account this issue. We can better understand the wrong strategy of CIU by looking to our

results. Although CIU tried to spearhead the referendum and focused its program in this point, individuals decide attending to other factors due to a varied party supply. In table 5 it can be seen that austerity measures played a role in vote choice, as did moral and ideology. While CIU wanted to be de defender of the national identity of the Catalan, those who were in favour of more autonomy or even a secession tend to trust in ERC more than in CIU.

When looking to the reasons to vote for a party, we found something similar to what happened in Galicia. Those who argue efficiency as reason of voting tend to vote less to other parties different to CIU; while pointing to ideals, the honesty of the party chosen or even voting for the less worse tend to be factors with a positive significant effect to vote for other party rather than for CIU.

Discussion.

Young voters can be determinant for the outcome of elections. Abstention in this group is higher than in others and this is why its mobilization can turn the polls. Although it is a group of great interest for political scientists, the problem with gathering representative data for this specific group is behind the absence of a profuse literature about youth vote. Moreover, the existent works have focused on the effects of socialization in the formation of party identification but we know very little about the reasons behind vote choice and how the emergence of issues related to the political agenda affects vote choice among young voters.

In this work we have tried to highlight the usefulness of VAAs as tools to collect data. As some of the problem with the using of VAAs is that most of the users are young, we understand this represents a window of opportunity for the study of social and political attitudes of young individuals.

At the same time, in this paper we have analyse vote in three regions with strong regional identities using a set of issues that is not usually present in general surveys. This, together with the introduction of variables related to the main reason to vote can help us to understand why voters decide for one party versus other and how the context affects on vote choice.

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Tables

TABLE 1

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: PSOE													
	PP		EAJ-PNV		EB-B		EH-BILDU		EZKER-ANITZA-IU		UPyD		EQUO	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	0,160	1,135	-3,851 ***	0,835	-3,486 **	1,413	-8,436 ***	0,943	-2,169 ***	0,817	1,320	1,032	-1,469 *	0,859
Ideogy	0,024 ***	0,008	0,010 **	0,005	-0,026 **	0,011	-0,010 **	0,005	-0,016 ***	0,005	0,009	0,007	-0,002	0,005
Basque Country	-6,300 ***	2,246	12,240 ***	1,175	6,077 ***	1,714	17,445 ***	1,251	5,290 ***	1,059	-8,520 ***	2,189	5,753 ***	1,165
Conservative morality	5,381 ***	1,653	1,145	1,173	0,811	2,023	-0,970	1,239	-1,825	1,348	4,303 ***	1,630	-0,597	1,405
Immigration	-0,043	0,269	-0,809 ***	0,192	-0,851 ***	0,319	-0,586 ***	0,193	-0,092	0,194	-0,075	0,254	-0,329	0,214
Austerity	-0,070	0,250	0,188	0,154	0,011	0,276	-0,005	0,156	-0,171	0,160	-0,261	0,228	-0,198	0,177
Gender: Male	-0,598	0,697	-0,121	0,409	-0,625	0,690	0,014	0,412	0,156	0,419	-0,223	0,678	-0,428	0,456
Education: Non Universitary	-2,185 *	1,195	-1,053 **	0,463	-0,455	0,793	-0,147	0,458	-0,935 *	0,481	-1,257	0,875	-0,669	0,530
Pseudo R ²														0,73
(N)														1106

*** p<0,01 , ** p<0,05 , * p<0,1.

TABLE 2

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: PSOE													
	PP		EAJ-PNV		EB-B		EH-BILDU		EZKER-ANITZA-IU		UPyD		EQUO	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	0,879	1,390	-3,481 ***	1,006	-2,336	1,515	-7,076 ***	1,061	-2,070 **	0,963	1,670	1,312	-0,907	1,001
Ideogy	0,026 ***	0,009	0,009 *	0,005	-0,023 **	0,011	-0,011 **	0,005	-0,015 ***	0,006	0,010	0,008	-0,001	0,006
Basque Country	-6,459 ***	2,332	12,404 ***	1,241	6,212 ***	1,726	16,869 ***	1,282	5,289 ***	1,086	-8,433 ***	2,405	5,746 ***	1,187
Conservative morality	5,097 ***	1,700	1,307	1,241	0,698	2,122	-1,219	1,298	-2,044	1,361	4,141 **	1,717	-0,766	1,415
Immigration	-0,124	0,274	-0,811 ***	0,203	-0,806 **	0,321	-0,579 ***	0,202	-0,085	0,200	-0,117	0,270	-0,326	0,219
Austerity	0,032	0,279	0,228	0,164	0,001	0,280	0,020	0,163	-0,166	0,164	-0,081	0,247	-0,189	0,181
Gender: Male	-0,591	0,715	-0,058	0,428	-0,531	0,713	0,043	0,427	0,119	0,429	-0,257	0,727	-0,400	0,465
Education: Non Universitary	-1,830	1,213	-1,323 ***	0,496	-0,644	0,826	-0,496	0,482	-1,052 **	0,493	-1,276	0,956	-0,752	0,542
Less bad	-0,809	0,883	-0,868	0,577	-1,933 **	0,961	-1,861 ***	0,590	-0,207	0,602	-1,424	0,878	-0,838	0,632
Ideals	-1,423	0,945	-1,811 ***	0,586	-1,753 **	0,879	-1,114 **	0,568	0,088	0,585	-0,690	0,848	-0,597	0,617
Efficiency	-0,212	1,592	1,904 *	1,057	-19,145	0,000	-0,544	1,095	-0,910	1,393	-0,747	1,669	-0,671	1,405
Honesty	18,552	7171,615	18,086	7171,615	18,159	7171,615	18,601	7171,615	18,683	7171,615	19,817	7171,615	18,386	7171,615
Pseudo R ²														0,78
(N)														1103

*** p<0,01 , ** p<0,05 , * p<0,1.

TABLE 3

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: PP											
	PSOE-PSG		BNG		Alternativa Galega de Esquerda		UPyD		Compromiso por Galicia		Other	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	5,081 ***	0,849	7,934 ***	0,842	7,765 ***	0,801	-1,556	1,070	7,272 ***	0,879	4,776 ***	0,783
Ideology	-0,019 ***	0,003	-0,023 ***	0,003	-0,027 ***	0,003	-0,017 ***	0,004	-0,012 ***	0,003	-0,013 ***	0,003
Galicia	-7,633 ***	1,584	-18,539 ***	1,653	-14,862 ***	1,508	3,687 **	1,845	-18,463 ***	1,795	-7,939 ***	1,431
Conservative morality	-3,437 ***	1,120	1,115	1,054	-0,272	0,930	-4,877 ***	1,202	3,286 ***	1,052	0,420	0,856
Immigration	-0,014	0,167	-0,163	0,165	-0,057	0,154	0,356 *	0,196	-0,279	0,174	0,187	0,151
Austerity	-0,610 ***	0,143	-0,565 ***	0,142	-0,642 ***	0,133	-0,530 ***	0,165	-0,486 ***	0,149	-0,536 ***	0,131
Gender: Male	0,328	0,357	0,481	0,351	0,715 **	0,336	1,168 **	0,484	1,000 ***	0,387	0,183	0,330
Education: Non University	0,675 *	0,381	0,344	0,379	0,436	0,360	0,323	0,454	0,052	0,409	0,219	0,360
Pseudo R ²												0,51
(N)												1714

*** p<0,01 , ** p<0,05 , * p<0,1.

TABLE 4

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: PP											
	PSOE-PSG		BNG		Alternativa Galega de Esquerda		UPyD		Compromiso por Galicia		Other	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	5,639 ***	0,956	8,345 ***	0,950	8,214 ***	0,913	-2,083 *	1,245	8,117 ***	0,984	5,382 ***	0,894
Ideology	-0,020 ***	0,004	-0,024 ***	0,004	-0,029 ***	0,003	-0,018 ***	0,004	-0,014 ***	0,004	-0,015 ***	0,003
Galicia	-8,071 ***	1,653	-19,438 ***	1,721	-15,599 ***	1,582	3,140	1,912	-19,030 ***	1,868	-8,295 ***	1,500
Conservative morality	-3,384 ***	1,149	1,229	1,083	-0,169	0,971	-4,746 ***	1,216	3,508 ***	1,101	0,379	0,897
Immigration	-0,018	0,178	-0,172	0,176	-0,069	0,166	0,344 *	0,205	-0,305	0,186	0,177	0,163
Austerity	-0,636 ***	0,152	-0,597 ***	0,152	-0,672 ***	0,144	-0,555 ***	0,171	-0,509 ***	0,159	-0,562 ***	0,142
Gender: Male	0,513	0,375	0,647 *	0,370	0,861 **	0,356	1,276 **	0,500	1,138 ***	0,406	0,326	0,350
Education: Non University	0,710 *	0,406	0,393	0,405	0,491	0,388	0,450	0,483	0,110	0,435	0,264	0,387
Less bad	-0,557	0,472	0,086	0,470	-0,158	0,444	0,801	0,643	-0,989 *	0,514	-0,798 *	0,441
Ideals	0,150	0,432	0,385	0,428	0,332	0,411	1,516 **	0,605	-0,419	0,450	0,142	0,400
Efficiency	-2,602 ***	0,834	-2,516 ***	0,871	-4,206 ***	0,980	-0,498	0,848	-4,088 ***	1,223	-3,496 ***	0,876
Honesty	-1,111	0,901	0,057	0,768	0,543	0,719	1,191	0,882	0,146	0,761	-0,229	0,727
Pseudo R ²												0,54
(N)												1707

*** p<0,01 , ** p<0,05 , * p<0,1.

TABLE 5

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: CIU											
	Ciutadans		ERC-CAT		ICV-EUiA		PP		PSC-PSOE		Other	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	7,882 ***	0,472	-1,531 ***	0,360	5,991 ***	0,352	6,378 ***	0,636	7,475 ***	0,470	3,880 ***	0,303
Ideogy	-0,009 ***	0,002	-0,015 ***	0,001	-0,020 ***	0,001	0,003	0,003	-0,017 ***	0,002	-0,018 ***	0,001
Catalonia	-14,138 ***	0,590	3,130 ***	0,375	-7,474 ***	0,364	-15,468 ***	0,965	-12,154 ***	0,541	-3,198 ***	0,311
Conservative morality	-2,527 ***	0,473	-1,303 ***	0,251	-4,070 ***	0,419	-0,962 *	0,559	-4,336 ***	0,621	-1,266 ***	0,249
Immigration	0,125	0,096	0,127 ***	0,043	0,330 ***	0,059	0,174	0,132	0,164	0,100	0,134 ***	0,044
Austerity	-0,465 ***	0,081	-0,549 ***	0,037	-0,698 ***	0,049	-0,121	0,121	-0,669 ***	0,084	-0,642 ***	0,038
Gender: Male	0,262	0,228	0,018	0,096	-0,231 *	0,120	-0,605 *	0,329	-0,150	0,209	0,071	0,096
Education: Non University	-0,358	0,271	0,203 *	0,117	0,109	0,151	-0,467	0,387	0,119	0,257	0,308 ***	0,116
Pseudo R ²											0,59	
(N)											6159	

*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1.

TABLE 6

	VOTE INTENTION. Reference Category: CIU											
	Ciutadans		ERC-CAT		ICV-EUiA		PP		PSC-PSOE		Other	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Intercept	7,672 ***	0,511	-1,659 ***	0,378	5,639 ***	0,377	5,871 ***	0,703	7,200 ***	0,510	3,898 ***	0,322
Ideogy	-0,009 ***	0,002	-0,015 ***	0,001	-0,020 ***	0,001	0,004	0,003	-0,017 ***	0,002	-0,018 ***	0,001
Catalonia	-14,217 ***	0,599	3,208 ***	0,388	-7,534 ***	0,377	-15,609 ***	0,991	-12,187 ***	0,553	-3,314 ***	0,324
Conservative morality	-2,512 ***	0,484	-1,328 ***	0,258	-4,093 ***	0,426	-0,797	0,570	-4,382 ***	0,635	-1,301 ***	0,255
Immigration	0,137	0,098	0,120 ***	0,044	0,315 ***	0,060	0,194	0,136	0,154	0,102	0,127 ***	0,045
Austerity	-0,471 ***	0,083	-0,547 ***	0,038	-0,696 ***	0,051	-0,120	0,125	-0,667 ***	0,085	-0,644 ***	0,039
Gender: Male	0,264	0,232	0,060	0,099	-0,234 *	0,123	-0,554 *	0,335	-0,114	0,213	0,071	0,099
Education: Non University	-0,458	0,279	0,184	0,120	0,070	0,155	-0,376	0,389	0,078	0,262	0,293 **	0,119
Less bad	0,245	0,275	0,144	0,124	0,349 **	0,167	0,852 **	0,388	0,510 *	0,270	-0,055	0,126
Ideals	0,301	0,257	0,453 ***	0,104	0,952 ***	0,142	0,740 **	0,365	0,777 ***	0,246	0,420 ***	0,107
Efficiency	-0,949	0,622	-1,996 ***	0,219	-1,203 ***	0,348	-1,254	0,847	-2,113 **	1,070	-1,347 ***	0,193
Honesty	2,441 ***	0,376	0,033	0,245	1,970 ***	0,261	-0,044	0,873	0,229	0,657	1,461 ***	0,217
Pseudo R ²											0,62	
(N)											6105	

*** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1.